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1   Introduction 
 
Labour market institutions play a key role in explaining international differences in labour market 
performance. The most important labour market institutions considered in previous research are the 
unemployment benefit system and active labour market policy, the system of wage determination 
(wage bargaining co-ordination, union density, collective bargaining coverage), labour taxes includ-
ing contributions to the social security system and employment protection (see 
Nickell/Nunziata/Ochel 2005). 
There are a great number of studies which explore the implications of institutions for the unem-
ployment rate (see Nickell 1997, Blanchard/Wolfers 2000, Nickell/Layard 1999, Bertola/Blau/Kahn 
2001, Berthold/Fehn 2002, Nickell 2003, Belot/van Ours 2004, Griffith/Harrison/Macartney 2007). 
Although the results are still somewhat mixed (OECD 2004), there seems to emerge a consensus 
that labour market institutions are an important determinant of unemployment. For instance, Nickell 
(2003) reports that shifts in labour market institutions explain a great part of movements in unem-
ployment across OECD countries. Employment protection, labour taxes and the unemployment 
benefit system increases unemployment and especially unemployment persistence. 
 
The unemployment rate is only one among a greater list of indicators of labour market performance. 
In a study for 60 countries, Caballero et al. (2004) find that job security regulation reduces the 
speed of adjustment of employment to shocks and lowers the growth rate of total factor productiv-
ity. The results in Gomez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2004) show that the strictness of em-
ployment protection, the extent of wage bargaining co-ordination and the generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits have a negative effect on job creation and the pace of job reallocation. Messina 
(2004) finds that more unionized and coordinated wage-setting structures as well as employment 
protection imply a lower employment share in the service industry that is the most expanding sector 
in modern economies. 
 
In the following, we analyse the effects of labour market institutions on the labour intensity of out-
put growth. To be concrete, we use the concept of the employment threshold as the variable to be 
explained. The employment threshold represents the growth rate of production which is necessary 
for keeping employment constant. We show how this concept is related to the elasticities of labour 
demand and to the development of input prices and how various labour market institutions may 
affect it. If a specific regulation increases the employment threshold, a country needs a higher 
growth rate in order to keep employment constant. This increases the likelihood of a weak employ-
ment performance and of a higher unemployment rate. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical foundations of the concept 
of the employment threshold. In section 3 we present the empirical model for the estimation of the 
employment thresholds and the empirical analysis of the effects of different labour market institu-
tions. Section 4 summarises and draws some conclusions    3
2   Theoretical foundations 
 
2.1   Labour demand and the employment threshold 
 
In the following we assume that output  y  is produced by employing the input factors labour L and 
capital  K . If firms minimize their production costs at given input prices and for a given level of 
output, there exists under weak assumptions with regard to production technology a dual cost func-
tion (see e.g. McFadden, 1976, or Chambers, 1988): 
(1)  () ,,, CC l q y T =  , 
where C  indicates the minimum costs of producing output  y  at the wage rate l and the user cost of 
capital  q. The variable T  represents the state of technology. In order to be able to represent all 
economically relevant information of the underlying technology, the cost function must meet cer-
tain regularity conditions: C  must be increasing in  q l,  and  y and has to be concave and linearly 
homogenous in landq. 
The demand for labour is derived via Shephard’s Lemma: 
(2)  () ,,,
C






After totally differentiating equation (2) with respect to time and some manipulations we get the 
growth rate of labour input: 
(3)  T T L y y L q l l L L w w w w , , / , ε ε ε + + = , 
where  x w  denotes the growth rate of variable x and  y L l L , , ,ε ε  and  T L, ε  are the elasticities of labour 
demand with respect to the wage rate, output and the state of technology, respectively. It should be 
stressed that all elasticities are typically not constant and depend on output, factor prices and tech-
nology (for a more intensive discussion of these topics see Flaig/Rottmann, 2001). Thus, they are 
varying over time and across countries. 
The employment threshold is defined as the growth rate of output which is necessary to keep em-
ployment constant (Flaig/Rottmann, 2001). By setting  L w  in equation (3) equal to zero and solving 
for y w , we get the employment threshold
ET
y w : 
(4)  ( ) y L T T L q l l L
ET
y w w w , , / , / ε ε ε + − =  . 
Since  l L, ε  is negative, a higher growth rate of the relative wage (l/q) leads to an increase of the em-
ployment threshold. A higher pace of technical progress increases the employment threshold since 
T L, ε is typically negative in a cost minimising approach.   4
2.2   Effects of labour market institutions on the employment threshold 
As can be seen from equation (4), the effects of labour market institutions on labour demand and the 
employment threshold can work via different channels. The first channel concerns the effects on 
growth rates of input prices, the second channel on the elasticities. For example, tighter employ-
ment protection may deteriorate the flexibility of an economy and may thus lower the growth rate of 
total factor productivity (Caballero et al. 2004). This would decrease the employment threshold by 
reducing  T w . However, it should be kept in mind that  , LT T w ε  not only captures total factor produc-
tivity growth but also the effect of biased technical change. A higher wage rate induced by a higher 
employment protection of insiders may lead to a technology-driven reduction in labour demand 
(increasing the absolute value of T , L ε ) which increases the employment threshold. In addition, a 
tighter employment protection reduces probably the elasticity of labour demand with respect to out-
put and therefore increases the employment threshold. For all these reasons, the magnitude and even 
the sign of the effect of a more stringent employment protection on the employment threshold is 
theoretically unclear. In the end, this is an empirical question. 
Similar reasoning applies for other labour market institutions. Institutions may affect factor prices, 
elasticities of labour demand, adjustment costs and the growth rate and the bias of technical change 
and thereby labour demand and employment (for a discussion of this topic see Nickell/Layard, 
1999). Due to the complex nature of these effects, in the following we do not estimate a structural 
model but try to investigate the relationships between institutions and labour demand in a reduced 
form framework which is explained in the next section. 
 
3   Empirical results 
3.1   The employment threshold across countries and over time 
Since we do not have international comparable data for the user costs of capital, we do not estimate 
the structural labour demand equation (3), but a reduced form where we treat the sum of 
q l l L w / , ε and  T T L w , ε  as an unobserved variable (for simplicity of notation we omit the country in-
dex). Under this assumption we get the following estimation equation: 
(5)   t t y t t t L u w w + + = , , 2 , 1 , β β  . 
The possibly time-varying parameters  t , 1 β  and  t , 2 β  are defined as  1, , / , tL l l q L T T ww β εε =+ and 
y L t , , 2 ε β = . The variable  t u  is a white noise error term. The employment threshold defined in 
equation (4) is now given by the expression  t , t , 2 1 β β − .  
For the specification of  1 β and  2 β  we choose alternatively two different statistical models: A first 
order random walk process (RW1) and a second order random walk process (RW2):   5
(6a)   () t , i t , i L ν β = − 1  
(6b)   () t , i t , i L ν β = −
2 1  
with  L as the lag operator. The model (equations (5) and (6)) is set in a state-space-form and is 
estimated for each country individually by maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter (for details 
on the Kalman filter see Harvey 1989). According to different test statistics (Akaike information 
criterion, Ljung-Box statistic for testing the white noise properties of the recursive residuals, Jar-
que-Bera statistic for testing the normal distribution of recursive residuals) the first order random 
walk model outperforms for most countries slightly the second order specification. The disadvan-
tage is that in some cases the first order random walk model produces some erratic movements of 
the employment threshold. We check the robustness of our results by modelling the time varying 
parameters alternatively as a second order random walk. Second order random walks can accom-
modate complex time series properties of variables but produce a “smooth” development. Prelimi-
nary tests in both specifications showed that  2 β varies between countries but is constant or almost 
constant over time within a country. In our final model for which we present the results below, for 
each country  2 β  is therefore modelled as a constant parameter. In contrast, β1 varies both between 
countries and over time. 
We estimate the model for each of 17 OECD countries individually (see table 1), using yearly data 
from 1971 to 2002. The dependent variable is the growth rate of labour input in the private sector. 
Labour input is measured as total hours worked. The explanatory variable is the growth rate of real 
value added in the private sector (Source for both variables: OECD, Economic Outlook). Produc-
tion and employment in the public sector are not included. The data for Germany refer to West 
Germany until 1990 and to unified Germany from 1991 onwards. In order to eliminate the “outlier” 
in the growth rates for 1991, we include a dummy variable, which takes the value one in 1991 and 
zero in all other years. 
In table 1, we present the average values of the estimated employment thresholds for both specifica-
tions in the private sector in the 17 countries for different sample periods. Independently of the ran-
dom walk specification, the employment threshold declined during the sample period in most coun-
tries. The unweighted mean of the employment thresholds was 3.8 % (3.9 %) during the seventies, 
2.4 % (2.4 %) during the eighties and 1.4 % (1.5 %) in the years after 1990 for the RW1 (RW2) 
specification of the employment threshold, respectively. In Germany, Japan and the USA the em-
ployment thresholds increased by about 1 percentage point from the eighties to the nineties. It 
should be noted that, compared with the first two countries, the employment threshold is still rela-
tively low in the USA. It is remarkable that especially in the continental European countries the 
employment threshold is relatively high, compared with Australia, Canada, Sweden, the UK and the 
United States. A very special case is New Zealand: The employment threshold is in many years 
negative. During the nineties the labour volume would have increased even in a recession.   6
Table A1 in the Appendix contains the minima, maxima, means and the standard deviations of 
RW1 and RW2. Additionally to the overall standard deviations (OV) the table shows the standard 
deviations within countries (WI) and between countries (BE). The overall standard deviation for the 
RW2 is slightly smaller than that of the RW1, where the between standard deviations are the same 
for both specifications. The RW1 varies more about time as the higher within standard deviation 
reveals.  
   7
Table 1: Employment thresholds (RW1, RW2) in OECD countries 
  Mean of RW1 
Country 1980  1990 2002 1971-2002
Aus  0.013    0.013    0.013  0.013 
Bel  0.063    0.032    0.020  0.037 
Can  0.012    0.012    0.012    0.012   
Dnk  0.042    0.026    0.025  0.030 
Fin  0.038    0.037    0.037    0.037   
Fra  0.046    0.038    0.021  0.034 
Ger  0.053    0.017    0.024  0.031 
Ire  0.059    0.041    0.016  0.037 
Ita  0.072    0.014    0.019  0.034 
Jpn  0.039    0.022    0.033  0.032 
Nld  0.037    0.036    0.014  0.028 
Nzl  -0.013    0.015    -0.037  -0.013 
Nor  0.061    0.027    0.028  0.038 
Esp  0.050    0.032    0.008  0.029 
Swe  0.031    0.021    0.022  0.024 
Gbr  0.032    0.022    0.019  0.024 
USA  0.012    0.007    0.014  0.011 
Total  0.038    0.024    0.017  0.026 
 
  Mean of RW2 
Country 1980  1990 2002 1971-2002
Aus  0.014    0.012    0.011  0.012 
Bel  0.060    0.039    0.015  0.036 
Can  0.017    0.010    0.013  0.013 
Dnk  0.046    0.025    0.023  0.030 
Fin  0.042    0.038    0.033  0.037 
Fra  0.047    0.035    0.022  0.034 
Ger  0.054    0.016    0.024  0.031 
Ire  0.065    0.039    0.010  0.036 
Ita  0.066    0.022    0.013  0.033 
Jpn  0.040    0.021    0.033  0.032 
Nld  0.042    0.030    0.016  0.028 
Nzl  -0.014    0.016    -0.040  -0.014 
Nor  0.061    0.027    0.028  0.038 
Esp  0.047    0.030    0.012  0.028 
Swe  0.034    0.021    0.020  0.024 
Gbr  0.034    0.023    0.016  0.024 
USA  0.014    0.005    0.015  0.011 
Total  0.039    0.024    0.015  0.026 
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3.2   The effects of labour market institutions on the employment threshold 
In the second step of our study we use the estimated employment thresholds for each year in the 
sample period 1971 to 2002 for each of the 17 OECD countries as an indicator for the labour inten-
sity of production and study its relationship to labour market institutions. We concentrate our inter-
est on the effects of employment protection, labour taxes (measured by the tax wedge), union den-
sity and the degree of co-ordination in wage negotiations. 
Every country in the world has established a complex system of laws and institutions (so-called 
“case law” and collective agreements) intended to protect the interests of workers. We use the Em-
ployment Protection Index (EP) from the Labour Market Institutions Database of Nickell and Nun-
ziata (2001) as a measure of the strictness of this system. This series was built chaining OECD data 
(Employment Protection Legislation Index Version I) with data from Lazear (1990). For the recent 
years we use the information of Nickell (2003) and the OECD (2004) by linearly interpolating the 
missing years and connecting with the series of the just mentioned database. The variable in the 
range {0, 2} is increasing with the strictness of employment protection.  
The OECD indicator takes into account regulations concerning individual dismissals, collective 
dismissals and the temporary employment forms such as fixed-term employment and the supply of 
labour by temporary work agencies. Although the OECD has elaborated, with the country ranking, 
the most highly differentiated evaluation scheme made so far, there are still some restrictions with 
regard to the reliability of the indicators. The EP covers a set of different types of labour market 
institutions and obviously, the aggregate level can hide some internal movements which neutralise 
each other. Therefore, one difficult problem is the weighting of the evaluated aspects of regulation. 
Therefore, we compare EP with another index of employment regulation, recently introduced by the 
World Bank (2005). The Rigidity of Employment Index (REI) of the World Bank for the year 2004 
is based on a detailed study of employment laws and regulations, as well as relevant constitutional 
provisions. This index takes into consideration information about hiring and firing of workers and 
the rigidity of working hours. In figure 1 we compare the World Bank index for the year 2004 with 
the OECD index (EPI) for the year 2003. Both institutions assess the regulations of the employment 
protection very similar in the different countries. The rank correlation coefficient between the two 
variables is 0.79 and is highly significant. 
   9












































We take the tax wedge (TW), union density (UDNET) and the co-ordination index (COW) from 
Nickell (2001, 2003). TW (in decimal notations) measures the total tax rate on labour and contains 
payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes. UDNET is calculated as the percentage of em-
ployees who are union members. Another aspect of wage bargaining is the extent to which bargain-
ing is co-ordinated. COW is an index with range {0, 2} constructed as an interpolation of OECD 
data by Nickell. It is increasing in the degree of co-ordination in the bargaining process on the em-
ployers´ as well as on the unions´ side. Table A2 in the Appendix contains the minima, maxima, 
means and the standard deviations of these variables. Additionally to the overall standard deviations 
(OV) the table incorporates the standard deviations within countries (WI) and between countries 
(BE). In contrast to the estimated employment thresholds the within standard deviations for the 
variables of the labour market institutions are much smaller than the overall standard deviations, 
because the most part of variation in the labour market institutions is between countries.  
Table 2 presents the OLS results for the estimation period 1971 to 2000 and the dependent variable 
RW1.
1 Explanatory variables are the employment protection index (EP), union density (UDNET), 
the tax wedge (TW) and the wage bargaining co-ordination index COW.  The two models differ 
with respect to the modelling of time effects. Model 1 contains a linear time trend, model 2 includes 
in addition a squared time trend. In order to compare the fit of the models we report the values of 
the Adjusted R
2. Because the left hand side variable is a generated variable, we show additionally to 
                                            
1 We must restrict our estimation period, because we can observe some of the explanatory variables only until 2000.     10
the normal also the robust standard errors, but this makes no difference. Simple tests prefer clearly 
the model 2 against model 1, but the results are very similar.
2 
Table 2: OLS Regression for RW1 
 
  model 1  model 2 












***    .0099   .0023
***     .0024
***   
UDNET  -.0045   .0051  .0046  -.0024   .0051      .0045 
TW .0183    .0094
* .0105
*      .0170   .0092
*       .0104     
COW .0048    .0019
** .0018
**     .0039   .0019
**      .0019
**    
Trend -.0010    .0001
*** .0001
***    -.0026   .0004
***     .0005
*** 
Trend^2 ---------- ---------- ----------  .0001    .0000
***     .0000
*** 
constant .0218    .0040
*** .0043
***    .0296   .0044
***     .0051
*** 
Adj. R
2  0.26 0.29 
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 
 
In both specifications, the employment protection index exerts a highly significant positive effect on 
the employment threshold. An increase in the EP index by one point increases the employment 
threshold by 1 percentage point (Model 2). During the period 1992 to 2002 Germany had on aver-
age an employment threshold of 2.4 %, whereas the actual output growth rate in the business sector 
during this period was only 1.7 %. If there were a regime with an employment protection compara-
ble to the UK, the employment threshold would be only 1.4 %. The tax wedge TW increases the 
employment threshold, but the effect is only weakly significant. The degree of co-ordination COW 
has a positive effect on the threshold. If in Germany there were a regime with a degree of co-
ordination comparable to the UK, the employment threshold would be lower by 0.4 percentage 
points.
3 The effect of union density UDNET is always insignificant. 
 
The reason for the insignificance of UDNET may be that not union density per se but the coverage 
of workers by collective bargaining provisions is the more important factor. In some countries there 
are extremely large differences between these two variables. For example, in France the union den-
sity was about 10 percent in the last decade, but the coverage by collective bargaining provisions is 
assessed to be about 90 percent. In sectoral bargaining systems employer behaviour combined with 
                                            
2 In order to check the stability of the results, we have also included dummies for each year. This has no effects on the 
interpretation of the results in all estimations. Detailed results are not shown, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
3 We have also included COW squared in our estimations, but COW squared was always insignificant.. The reason for 
including COW2 is that labour market performance may not be a monotonic but a U-shaped or hump-shaped functi-
on of the co-ordination index. (see, e.g., Calmfors/Driffill 1988).   11
administrative governance of collective contracts may be more important for the coverage rates than 
union membership (OECD, 2004). As an indicator of collective bargaining coverage we could use 
the Collective Bargaining Coverage Index (CBC), which stems from the OECD (2004). We show 
no results with this index, because there are information on CBC only for the years 1980, 1990 and 
2000. Therefore, we would have to neglect many observations of our data and crudely interpolate 
CBC for the remaining years in order to estimate the effect of CBC.
4 
 
There is some concern that the results are influenced by the method estimating the employment 
thresholds. Table 3 shows the OLS results with RW2 as the dependent variable. It makes no differ-
ence with respect to the interpretation of the results, whether we calculate normal or robust standard 
errors and whether we us a linear time trend, a squared time trend or time dummies. Comparing the 
estimates with that of table 2 we find on average very similar parameter estimates with a little bit 
smaller standard errors. In addition, the adjusted R
2 in table 3 are higher than in table 2. In our per-
spective these results are not surprising. The random walk of second order generates a smoother 
development of the employment thresholds than the random walk of first order. Therefore the stan-
dard deviation within countries is smaller for RW2 than for RW1, but the standard deviation be-
tween the countries doesn’t chance.
5 Giving more weight to the between variation it is not surpris-
ing that the labour market institutions can better explain the RW2, because the variations of the la-
bour market institutions within countries are also small (see table A2).  
Table 3: OLS Regression for RW2
 
 
  model 1  model 2 










EP .0071    .0019
***    .0019
***    .0088   .0018
***     .0018
***   
UDNET  -.0054   .0041      .0041      -.0027   .0040      .0040 
TW .0201    .0076
***    .0091
**     .0185   .0073
**      .0089
**    
COW .0051    .0015
***    .0016
***    .0040   .0015
***     .0015
***  
Trend -.0011    .0001
***    .0001
***  -.0031   .0003
***     .0004
*** 
Trend^2 ---------- ---------- ----------  .0001    .0000
***  .0000
*** 
constant .0237    .0032
***  .0038
***    .0337   .0034
***     .0043
*** 
Adj. R
2  0.37 0.42 
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 
 
                                            
4 If we neglect the seventies and linearly interpolate CBC for the remaining years, the indicator for collective bargain-
ing coverage has no effect on the employment threshold in all specifications. 
5 As the means of RW1 and RW2 are very similar, there is no problem comparing the standard deviations of the vari-
ables.   12
There are some reasons why our explaining variables may be endogenous. Labour market institu-
tions can be thought of as instruments that correct for market failures, which make up for the ab-
sence of a complete set of contingent markets for risk sharing (Agell 2002, Greg/Manning 1997, 
Saint-Paul 1996)). This suggests that many of the labour market rigidities originally emerged as a 
defensive reaction to the threat of unemployment. This poses the following question: Are the labour 
market institutions also endogenous in respect to the employment thresholds? This seems to be less 
likely, because the employment thresholds are not directly observable and can be estimated only 
with a time lag. However, the endogeneity of the labour market institution cannot be excluded by 
theoretical arguments. In order to control the robustness of our results, we execute instrumental 
variable estimations. To avoid a possible estimation bias due to correlations of the labour market 
institutions with the contemporary error terms, we instrument all labour market institutions by their 
lagged and second lagged observations. Table 4 presents the results for RW1 and RW2 each with a 
quadratic trend and robust standard errors.  
Table 4: IV-Estimation for RW1 and RW2 
 
  RW1 RW2 
 parameter  standard  error 
robust
parameter standard  error 
robust
EP .0092    .0023
***     .0086  .0017
*** 
UDNET  .0002   .0042       -.0001   .0036     
TW  .0106   .0099       .0125   .0081      
COW .0040    .0018
**      .0038   .0015
**     
Trend -.0025    .0005
***     -.0031   .0004
***    
Trend^2 .0000    .0000
***  .0001   .0000
***    
constant .0318    .0050
***     .0358   .0042
***    
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 
 
Comparing the results with their respective OLS estimates we find only minor differences. The co-
efficients of TW are now a little bit smaller and get insignificant. In both specifications test statis-
tics support the validity of our estimations. The Hansen J statistics of overidentifying restrictions 
take the values 3.39 (RW2) and 5.80 (RW1) each with four degrees of freedom and so do not reject 
the validity of the instruments used. The C test
6, (Eichenbaum/Hansen/Singleton 1988) shows that 
                                            
6 The test is computed as the difference between two J statistics where the first is computed from the efficient estima-
tion method using the full set of overidentifying restrictions (including the regressors as instruments) and the second 
is calculated from the inefficient but consistent regression using a smaller set of identifying restrictions (without the 
regressors as instruments). In our case OLS is the efficient model under the H0 that the institutions are exogenous re-
gressors and the IV estimation is the consistent but inefficient estimation method under H0.
.The degrees of freedom 
for the J-tests are respectively eight and four.    13
the labour market institutions can be treated as exogenous.
7 Therefore, we prefer the OLS-estimates 
in tables 2 and 3 to the IV estimates in table 4.   
 
Our IV estimations and the tests are only valid if there are no unobserved country effects which are 
correlated with the labour market institutions. To get a grip on this problem we can in principle es-
timate a fixed effects model. But as we have already seen, the labour market institutions vary not 
very much within countries. Together with potential measurement errors this could lead to more 
biased estimates for the fixed effects estimator than the simple OLS estimator (Hsiao 2003, Ch 10). 
Table 5 shows the results of the fixed effects estimations (with the within transformation.) The only 
labour market institution with a significant influence is now EP. To treat the measurement problem 
we can estimate a fixed effects model with instrumental variables. In our case it is not possible to 
estimate the fixed effects model with the within transformation, because there are no strictly exoge-
nous instruments available. Assuming no autocorrelation in the measurement errors and using the 
first difference transformation we estimate the models with the second and third lag of al labour 
market institutions variables as instruments (Wooldridge 2002, Ch. 11). As with the comparison 
between OLS and IV estimations the fixed effects estimations and the unobserved component 
model with IV estimation differ only slightly.  
Table 5: Fixed-effects Regression for RW1 and RW2 
 
  RW1 RW2 
 parameter  Robust  standard 
error 
parameter Robust  standard 
error t
EP .0203    .0056
***      .0145  .0041
***   
UDNET  .0199   .0167  .0089   .0109 
TW  .0138   .0282       .0198   .0151  
COW  .0024   .0027       .0012   .0018      
Trend -.0028    .0005
***     -.0032   .0003
***    
Trend^2 .0001    .0000
***   .0001   .0000
***     
constant  .0131   .0121   .0264   .0082
***     
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 
 
In the fixed effects model, the only significant institutional factor for explaining the development of 
the employment threshold in the different countries over time is employment protection. However, 
as already mentioned, although using a fixed effects specification may solve the problem of a corre-
lation between unobserved country individual effects and explaining variables, it may aggravate the 
problem of measurement errors (also by IV estimation if the measurement errors are autocorrelated) 
and ignores totally the information between countries. 
                                            
7 The C tests do not reject the null of the exogeneity of the labour market institutions with the p-values of 93% (RW2) 
and 97% (RW1).   14
 
Taking all estimation results together, the very robust result is that a more stringent employment 
protection reduces the labour intensity of production and may contribute to a higher unemployment 
rate. Although not in every specification significant, a higher tax wedge and a higher wage bargain-
ing co-ordination are also factors that reduce labour demand and therefore increase the employment 
threshold. 
 
4   Summary and Conclusions 
Labour market institutions affect labour demand via many channels. They may have an effect on the 
level and the growth rate of real wages, they influence the pace and the bias of technical progress 
and they are a major determinant of the flexibility of firms in adapting to various shocks. Due to the 
very complex nature of the interrelationships among all these factors we don’t estimate a structural 
model but – in analogy to the common practice in the literature – a reduced form with a special in-
dex of labour intensity of output growth as the dependent variable and various measures of labour 
market institutions as the explaining variables. The index for labour intensity used in this paper is 
the so-called employment threshold. The employment threshold is the growth rate of production 
that is necessary to keep employment constant. Theoretically, the employment threshold depends on 
various elasticities of the labour demand function and the growth rates of real factor prices and 
technical progress. A higher employment threshold reduces the probability that employment is in-
creasing and thus raises the likelihood of a higher unemployment rate. 
In this paper we have shown that the employment threshold is not only a possibly time-varying pa-
rameter but also depends on labour market institutions. A more restrictive employment protection, a 
higher tax wedge and a higher extent of wage bargaining co-ordination all lead to a less labour-
intensive production and require a higher growth rate of output in order to keep employment con-
stant. The effect of employment protection is highly significant in all econometric specifications; 
the effects of a higher tax wedge and a higher extent of wage bargaining co-ordination are always 
positive, but in some specifications not significant. The likely economic reasons for these effects are 
the induced pressure on wages and higher direct costs of using labour instead of capital and other 
factors as production inputs. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 






RW1  .0258 -.0921   .1525 .0237   .0134   .0198  
RW2  .0256   -.0923   .1167 .0217   .0134   .0174  
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
 






EP  1.0568       .1   2 .5145   .5037   .1598  
UDNET  .4314        .09   .9112 .2025   .1985   .0644  
TW  .4999   .2431   .8314 .1248   .1233   .0467  
COW  1.1011       0   2 .6234   .5287   .3536  
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